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Digital Public Infrastructure or Digital Colonialism? The Governance Debate Africa Must Win

  • DPI
  • 5 min read

In 2023, Cameroon quietly signed a memorandum with Huawei to build its national digital identity platform — a seamless package that included biometric enrolment, a smart-city backbone, and a secure data centre. The details of the deal remain classified, but early leaks point to a familiar pattern: critical systems running behind Huawei firewalls, with master keys sitting thousands of kilometres away.

Across the continent, similar proposals surface every month. Chinese, American, European, Emirati, and Indian vendors arrive with glossy brochures and a promise to “deliver DPI in 18 months.” In return, they seek long-term contracts, privileged data access, or resource-backed financing.

Africa has seen versions of this story before — in structural adjustment programmes, concessionary railways, or oil-block licensing. The technology has changed, but the power imbalance has not.

Today, the central question is no longer whether Africa needs Digital Public Infrastructure.
It is who owns it, who governs it, and who will shape the continent’s digital future for the next fifty years.


The three models on Africa’s table

1. The Western philanthropy model

Platforms like MOSIP, Mojaloop, and OpenG2P dominate this space — largely open-source, modular, and grant-funded by global philanthropies.

Pros:
• Public code, customisable systems, and no single foreign master key.

Cons:
• Funding flows through foreign institutions, and critical support ecosystems are often centred outside Africa. “Open” still has gatekeepers.


2. The Chinese turnkey model

Already active in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Angola, this model offers rapid deployment and generous financing.

Pros:
• Fast, affordable, and workable even in low-capacity environments.

Cons:
• Closed source systems, data routed through foreign servers, and multi-decade maintenance contracts that leave governments dependent long after installation.


3. The European sovereignty model

Built on Estonia’s X-Road — and now adapted by Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa — this approach puts sovereignty at the core.

Pros:
• Fully open-source, interoperable by design, and built to guarantee citizen control.

Cons:
• Requires strong engineering capacity, which can slow adoption.


What’s at stake

In 2024, a West African country learned — through an independent Citizen Lab analysis — that its Chinese-built ID system uploaded biometric templates to servers in Guangzhou each night. The contract had labelled this “remote maintenance.”

In East Africa, a country running a Western-backed MOSIP system discovered in 2025 that its fingerprint matcher was a closed-source U.S. binary. When the company increased fees by 400%, there was no easy exit.

The lesson is consistent: openness on paper means little if core components or long-term operations remain externally controlled.


Who is getting it right?

Several African countries are quietly proving that sovereignty is possible — and powerful.

Rwanda:
Built Irembo in-house, keeps all data in Kigali, and upgrades systems with local engineers.

Mauritius:
Forked X-Road, rewrote key components locally, and requires joint development with Mauritian firms.

Ghana:
Hosts the Ghana Card database locally; key systems owned and operated by Ghanaian companies, with full source-code transfer embedded in contracts.

Togo:
Uses MOSIP but maintains sovereignty by staffing a national interoperability agency with over 120 Togolese engineers.

The shared success factor is not wealth.
It is deliberate political commitment to ownership and local capacity.


A governance playbook for Africa (2026–2030)

If African governments treat DPI like another quick infrastructure project — a “deliver before elections” investment — the continent risks waking up in 2050 with its digital backbone controlled by foreign entities.

The countries that are getting it right follow five non-negotiable principles:

1. No black boxes in foundational systems

Biometric matchers, payment switches, and data-exchange routers must be open-source or locally developed.

2. Local equity and skills transfer

Foreign vendors must operate through joint ventures with at least 40% local ownership and commit to full knowledge transfer within five years.

3. Data residency with independent audit rights

All citizen data must remain on African soil. Local auditors — not foreign vendors — should have unrestricted source-code access.

4. Interoperability by law

No proprietary lock-in. Use open standards such as X-Road protocols, Mojaloop schemas, and W3C verifiable credentials from day one.

5. Public code, public oversight

DPI components should be published in public repositories with open bug trackers — the Estonia model, not the turnkey model.


The sovereignty dividend

Countries that choose this harder path often sacrifice speed. But the long-term payoff is enormous.

• Rwanda can switch biometric vendors within months instead of decades.
• Mauritius can plug into future continental digital frameworks without renegotiating foreign contracts.
• Ghana improved investor confidence — raising $3 billion in 2024 — partly because credit agencies praised its “full national control over critical digital infrastructure.”

The return on sovereignty is not abstract. It shows up in economic stability, policy freedom, and the continent’s ability to innovate on its own terms.


The choice ahead

Every African president will face a tempting offer: “Sign here and your citizens will have digital ID and payments before the next election.”

But the fine print will decide whether historians in 2060 describe that signature as the moment Africa claimed its digital destiny — or the moment it outsourced it.

Digital Public Infrastructure can become Africa’s most powerful tool for self-determination.
Or it can become the most sophisticated extraction mechanism ever designed.

Africa still has room to choose. But the window narrows with every turnkey contract.